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Abstract--The paper deals with N-person nonzero-sum games in which the dynamics is described by 
lto stochastic differential equations. Sufficient conditions are found guaranteeing the Nash-equilibrium 
for the strategies of the players. The optimal strategies are solutions of certain partial initial value 
problems analogous to the Bellman equation in the theory of dynamic programming. Linear-quadratic 
games with and without a control dependent oise are studied. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
There are different approaches to the optimal control of dynamic stochastic systems. One can 
mention the martingale methods of Davis, et al. ,  which are very interesting from a theoretic 
point of view. In this paper we shall follow the approach of Fleming and Rishel[4], but to an 
optimal control in situations of conflicts, i.e. to stochastic differential games. The martingale 
methods (see [2]) can be also applied to problems imilar to those treated below. The approach 
chosen here makes possible a further application of the approximation a d numerical procedures 
developed by Chernousko and Kolmanovskii[1]. The game aspect of the problem is described 
as in Vaisbord and Zhukovskii[7]. The examples of linear-quadratic games come from the linear 
regulator problems [1,4,6]. The results presented here have been announced without any proof 
and details in [5]. 
2. FORMALIZAT ION OF THE GAME 
Let us consider the game 
(2.1) 
Here {1 . . . . .  N} is the set of the players participating in the game F. The evolution of the 
dynamic system E is described by a stochastic differential equation of the type 
d~(t) = f ( t ,  6, ul . . . . .  UN) dt  + tr(t, ~, u t . . . . .  UN) dw(t), t ~ [to, T], (2.2) 
with initial condition ~(t0) = ~0 E R ~ and where T > to -> 0. The process w = {w(t), t ~ [to, 
T]} is a standard m-dimensional Wiener process, defined on some complete probability space 
(~, ~, P) and adapted to a family F = {~,, t ~ [to, T]} of nondecreasing sub-G-algebras of
5. ~ ~ R ~ is the state vector process and ui ~ Ui C R ~, is the control of the ith player, i = 
1 . . . . .  N. Now let us make the following assumptions about the functions f ( t ,  x, u~ . . . . .  
UN) and G(t, x, u~ . . . . .  uN). Suppose 
and 
f : [to, T] x R~ x U, x ... x UN ~R ~, 
o ' :  [t0, T] x R ~ x U, x ... x tin R ~ x R",  
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have continuous partial derivatives and let C > 0 be a constant, such that 
I f ( t ,  0 . . . . .  0)[ + {or(t, 0 . . . . .  0){ -< C, 
N 
ILl + I<~1 + E (IL,I + I,~J)~ c,  
i=1 
where [.[ is a general symbol for the norms in the respective spaces. 
Each player has perfect observations of the state vector ~(t) at every moment ~ [to, T] 
and constructs his strategy in the game (2.1) as an admissible feedback control of the following 
type: 
where 
ui(t) = u,(t, ~(t)), 
u,(', .) : [to, 7"] x W , U, 
is a Borel function satisfying the conditions: 
(i) There exists a constant Mg > 0 such that 
[u,(t ,x) l -<M,(l  + Ix[), for a l l ( t ,x )  ~ [to, T] x R"; 
(ii) for each bounded set B C R" and T* ~ (to, T), there exists a constant K, > 0 such 
that for arbitrary x, y E B and t E [to, T*], 
]u~(t, x)  - ui(t,  Y)[ <= K~lx - Yl. 
Denote by 1.It the set of strategies of the ith player, i = 1 . . . . .  N, and 
N 
IX = I-I LI~. 
i= I  
Let a vector of strategies u = (u~ . . . . .  U.v) ~ 1I be called for brevity just a strategy. 
The assumptions made above imply the existence and sample path uniqueness of the solution 
= {~(t), t E [to, T]} of (2.2) corresponding to the control u E H. The process ~ is a Markov 
process. 
Let L~, tb~ be continuous functions satisfying the polynomial growth conditions: 
N 
[L,(t, x, u, . . . . .  UN)] ~ C,(X + Ixl + E [u'[) ~, 
i= l  
I~(/, x)l ~ C,(1 + fxlY, 
where k,Ci are positive constants. Introduce now the cost-function ~i(u) of the ith player: 
~i(u) = E,0.~o d)i(T, {(T))  + Li(t, ~, ul . . . . .  UN) dt , i = I . . . . .  N. 
.t to 
The object of each player in the game (2.1) is to minimize his own cost-function. 
3. MAIN RESULT  
Let us suppose that all players choose their strategies according to the principle of the 
stability of the situation, i.e. the unilateral deviation of a player leads in general to a maximization 
of his own cost-function. Thus we come to the following 
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DEFINITION 
The strategy u" ~ H is called a Nash-equilibrium strategy for the game (2.1), if for each 
u; E l.ti, 
~.,(u',,...,u~_,,u,,u~+,,...,u~¢)= > .,(,~), i = I , . . . ,N .  
Next we give sufficient conditions guaranteeing that u" E l I  is a Nash-equilibrium strategy 
for the game (2.1). Denote 
(uqlu,) = (u~ . . . . .  u~_,, u ,  u~.l . . . . .  u~) 
and 
Gi(t, x, u~l[ui) = W~/~(t, x) + ,c/ (uqlui)Wil(t, x) + L,(t, x, uqlu/), 
for all t ~ [to, T], x ~ R ~. Here ~c/(uqlu~) is the infinitesimal operator (see [3]) of the process 
under the strategy u'llu;. Now we present a result analogous to that of Varaiya[8,9]. 
THEOREM 
The strategy ue is a Nash-equilibrium strategy for the game (2.1), if there exist real-valued 
functions Wt;~(t, x) such that for all t E [to, T], x ~ R ~ and i = 1 . . . . .  N, the following 
conditions jointly hold: 
(a) W "~, w.~ w") w ~i) --, , . . x ,  --x~ are continuous; 
(b) Gi(t, x, u'lluT) = 0; 
(c) Gi(t, x, u'llu~) >- 0 for each strategy u~ E 1.I~; 
(d) W~'~(T, x) = O;(T, x). 
Proof. Let ~'(t) and ~")(t), t E [to, T], be the sample paths of the solutions of (2.2) 
corresponding to the strategies u~ and u'llu,, respectively. Write Ito-Dynkin's formula with u' 
and ~'(t): 
{ fT } 
W")(t, x) = E,.x W"~(T, I~'(T)) - [W~i)(r, ~e(r)) + ~/ (uqluT)W"'(r, ~'(r))] dr . 
This representation i  conjunction with (b) and (d) implies 
{ fT ) 
W"~(t, x) = E,.x O;(T, ~'(T)) + L,(r, ~', u'llu;) dr 
and hence 
WO3(to, ~)= E,0.~0(0,(T, ~ ' (T ) )+ f,~L~(t, ~', ue[luD dt}. 
Now write again Ito-Dynkin's formula, but with uellu; and ~")(t): 
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Taking into account conditions (c) and (d), we get 
W~i~(t, x) _-< E,.x{0i(T, ~I'I(T)) + 
which leads to 
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(i)¢ I W tto, ~o) <- E,o ~,, Oi(T r;~i)(T)) + 
Finally, we obtain 
Wti)(to, I;o) = "~i(u e) <= :L(u'llu~), 
f r L,(r, ~", uqlu,) dr} ,  
r" } Li(t, ~"', u~Hui) dt . 
J Io 
for eachu iE  11~, i = 1 . . . . .  N. 
Therefore, u' is a Nash-equilibrium strategy for the game (2.1). 
Remark. Note that W"~(t, x) is a solution of a dynamic programming equation of the type 
min Gi(t, x, uellu,) = O, 
u~ 
with a boundary condition 
W"~(T, x) = O,(T, x), 
for all t ~ [to, T], x E R", i = 1 . . . . .  N. 
4. LINEAR-QUADRATIC GAMES WITH A STATE AND 
CONTROL INDEPENDENT NOISE 
Let us consider the game (2.1), where the evolution of the dynamic system 1~ is described 
by the linear stochastic differential equation 
d~(t) = [A(t)~ + ~ B~(t)u~] dt + cr(t) t E [to, T], 
with initial condition ~(to) = Go. Here {0, w, u~, i = 1 . . . . .  N, are the same as in Sec. 2. 
A(t) is an n x n-matrix, or(t) is an n x m-matrix, and Bi(t) are n x v~-matrices, i = 1 . . . . .  
N. Let further prime denote vector or matrix transposition. The cost-function 3;,(u) of the ith 
player is the following quadratic functional: 
~i(u) = Et o. ~'(T)Di~(T) + f][~'(t)Mi(t)~(t)+ ~_~uj(t)N~/)(t)uj(t)]dt}.]=, 
Here Di, Mi(t) and Ny~(t), j = 1 . . . . .  N, are symmetric matrices with dimensions n x n, 
n x n and vi x v~, respectively, i = I . . . . .  N. 
Now consider the functions 
j=l 
N 
X wx~,'"mtt x) + ½ tr[a(t)VC]](t, x)] + x'Mi(t)x + ~, u]NJi~(t)uj, i = 1, . . . , N, 
j=l 
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where a = (r(r'. Conditions (b) and (c) from Sec. 3 are equivalent to the relations 
min G,(t, x, u'llu,) = G,(t, x, u'lluD = 0, i = 1 . . . . .  N. (4.1) 
ui 
Hence the Nash-equilibrium strategies uf are solutions of the following equations: 
aGi/Oui[=:u; = B:(t)W~i)(t, x) + 2~i)(t)uf = 0, 
i.e. 
u~ = -~ [N~,i)(t)]-tB:(t)W~i)(t, x), i = 1 . . . . .  N. 
Further, put uf, i = 1 . . . . .  N, in (b) and search W<~)(t, x) in the following special form: 
W<~)(t, x) = x'Oi(t)x + r~(t), (4.2) 
where 0~(t) is a symmetric n x n-matrix with 0~(T) = Di and r~(t) is a scalar function, i = 
1 . . . . .  N. Then 
u~ = - [~i)(t)]-~B:(t)O~(t)x, i = 1 . . . . .  N. (4.3) 
Thus for relations (b), we obtain 
x' O,(t) + A'(t)O~(t) + O,(t)A(t) + M,(t) - ~ Oj(t)Bj(t)[N~J)(t)]-~B~(t)O~(t) - O,(t) 
j= l  
X ~_~ Bj(t)[NJJ)(t)]-'Bj(t)O,(t)+ ~ Oj(t)Bj(t)[N~J)(t)]-'N)j)(t)[NJ')(t)]-tBj(t)Oj(t))x 
j=] j=t 
+ i,~(t) + tr[a(t)O~(t)] = O, i = I . . . . .  N ,  
and we come to the following. 
PROPOSIT ION 
Let in the linear-quadratic game (2. I) the matrices A(t), Bi(t), tr(t), Mi(t). N~)(t) be con- 
tinuous and D~ be constant. Let the matrices Di and M~(t) be nonnegative definite and N!'~(t) be 
positive definite. Now, 
(i) If the set of matrices 0i(t), i = 1 . . . . .  N, is the solution of the system of matrix 
Riccati differential equations 
N 
0 = Oi(t) + A'(t)O,(t) + Oi(t)A(t) + M,(t) - ~ 01(t)Bj(t)[N~J)(t)]-tB:(t)O,(t) 
j=l  
N N 
- O,(t) ~,  Bj(t)[N~)(t)]-~B:(t)Oj(t) + ~, Oj(t)Bj(t)[N~J'(t)l-~Njj)(t)[NJ2)(t)]-tB;(t)Oj(t), 
j=l  j - I  
i=1  . . . . .  N, 
with boundary conditions 
Oi(T) = O i, i = 1 . . . . .  N, 
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and 
ft ? 
r,(t) = tr[a('r)0,('r)] d~. i = 1 . . . . .  N; 
(ii) then W'~'(t, x) given by (4.2) are the solutions of the dynamic programming equations 
(4.1) and u;. i = 1 . . . . .  N, defined by (4.3) are the Nash-equi l ibr ium strategies for the 
l inear-quadratic game (2.1) considered in this section. 
5. LINEAR-QUADRATIC GAMES WITH CONTROLLED DRIFT AND 
DIFFUSION COEFFICIENTS 
Let the evolution of the dynamic system ~ of the game (2.1) be described by the l inear 
stochastic differential equation 
N 
d~(t) = [A(t)~ + ~ B,(t)ui] dt + or(t, g~, ul . . . . .  us) dw(t), 
i=1 
t U- [to, T], 
with initial condition ~(t0) = ~o E R. Here ~ ~ R is the state process, w = {w(t), t ~ [to, 7"]} 
is an (N + 2)-dimensional standard Wiener process and u, ~ U~ C R is the control of the ith 
player, i = 1 . . . . .  N. Now or(t, ~, u~ . . . . .  U.v) is an 1 × (N + 2)-matrix of the form 
cr = (o'0(t)~ crl(t)ul "'" O'u(t)u~, cru÷ l(t)). 
Henceforth A(t), B~(t), i = 1 . . . . .  N, crj(t), j = 0 . . . . .  N + 1, are functions taking values 
in R. The cost-function ~(u)  of the ith player is the functional 
~,(u) = E,o,¢o{Di~:(T) + M~(t)gg2(t) + N}i)(t)u~(t dt , 
o j~l 
i=1  . . . . .  N. 
Here D~ are constants and M~(t), NJ~(t), j = 1 . . . . .  N, are real-valued functions, i = 
1 . . . . .  N .  
Now consider the functions 
Gi(t, x, u) = W~i)(t, x) + c'.t" (u)W")(t, x) + Li(t, x, u) 
[ ] '[ = OW")(t, x)/Ot + A(t)x + Bs(t)u j OWli)(t, x ) /ax + ~ cr~(t)x a 
.i=! 
N 1 N + ~ 4(04  + cr~+t(t) O2W")(t, x)/Ox a + Mi(t)x: + ~ N}i)(t)4, 
)=1 j=l 
i = 1 . . . . .  N. Condit ions (b) and (c) imply the relations 
min G,(t, x, u'[[ui) = Gi(t, x, u'[lu~) = 0, i = 1 . . . . .  N. 
Ur 
(5.1) 
Hence the Nash-equi l ibr ium strategies u,' are the solutions of the equations 
aGilOu,l.~., ' = B,(t) OWli~(t, x) lax + cry(t) azW~il(t, x)/ax'ui" " + 2N~i'l(t)u~ = O, 
i.e. 
u~ = -[o'S(t)  O"W'i~(t, x)/Ox: + 2Nl')(t)]-tBi(t) OWlil(t, x)/Ox, i = I . . . . .  N. 
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Next put u:, i = 1, . . . , N, in (b) and search W”‘(t, X) in the following special form 
wqt, x) = e,(t)2 + r,(t), (5.2) 
where e,(t) and r,(t) are real-valued functions, i = 1, . . . , N. Then 
‘T = -[Uf(t)e,(f) + ~“(?)I-‘Bi(t)e,(t)x, i = 1, . . . , N. (5.3) 
Now for relations (b), we have 
x2 
{ 
ii(t) + 2A(t)ei(t) - 2ei(t) i [~;(t)e,(t) + N;‘)(t)] -Tqt)e,(t) + u;(t) 
j-l 
+ e,(t) i ~.iwb$we,w + N:‘W*q(t)e;(t) + i N~~~(t)[u;(t)f3j(t) 
j-l /=I 
f N:“(r)]-*B~(t)8$t) + M,(t) + k,(t) + u?,+,(t)e,(t) = 0, i = 1, . . . , N, 
and we come to the following. 
PROPOSITION 
Let in the linear-quadratic game (2.1) the functions A(r), B,(t), u,(r), M,(r), q”(t) be 
continuous. Let Di be nonnegative constants, M,(r) be nonnegative functions and N!‘(r) be 
positive functions for each t E [to, T]. Thus 
(i) If the set of functions e,(t), i = 1, . . . , N, is the solution of the system of nonlinear 
differential equations 
pi + 
+ 
+ 
N 
2A(t)t&(t) - 2&(t) c [u~(t)8,(r) + N:“(t)]-‘Bj(r)B,(t) + o:(t) 
e,(t) E +)[u;(t)e,(t) + N~)(t)pj(t)ej(t) + hf,(t) + i ~yt)[~;(t)e,~t) 
j= I /=I 
N:“(t)]-25j(r)Bf(t) = 0, i = 1, . . . , N, 
with boundary conditions 
e,(T) = D;,i = I,. . . ,N, 
and 
T 
ri(t) = u;,,(r)&(r) dr, i = 1, . . . , N; 
(ii) then W’“(t, x) given by (5.2) are the solutions of the dynamic programming equations 
(5.1) and u:, i = 1, . . . , N, defined by (5.3) are the Nash-equilibrium strategies for the 
linear-quadratic game (2.1) considered in this section. 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper we consider Nash-equilibrium in stochastic differential games using the 
approach of Fleming and Rishel[4] to optimal control of stochastic dynamic systems. Thus we 
come to the solutions of certain partial initial value problems-analogues to the “Bellman 
equation.” This aspect is discussed in [4]. 
In the linear-quadratic games, considered in Sets. 4 and 5, the existence of the Nash- 
equilibrium strategies essentially depends on the existence of the solutions of the matrix Riccati 
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and nonlinear differential equations. This problem can be settled using the method of iterations 
for solving matrix Riccati differential equations or Bellman’s method of successive approxi- 
mations, based on the idea of a quasilinearization f nonlinear differential equations (see [6]). 
Nash-equilibrium comes in for criticism mainly as far as the concept of uniqueness is 
concerned. In Sets. 4 and 5 the existence of the Nash-equilibrium strategies implies their 
uniqueness, as well. 
Finally, we should mention that Nash-equilibrium as a concept of a solution of a stochastic 
differential game is a firm background for considering other kinds of solutions and their inter- 
action. 
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